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Abstract
We argue that Neural-Symbolic Integration is a topic
of central importance for the advancement of Artificial
General Intelligence.
What We Want
Artificial General Intelligence – the quest for artifi-
cially created entities with human-like abilities – has
been pursued by humanity since the invention of ma-
chines. It has also been a driving force in establishing
artificial intelligence (AI) as a discipline. 20th century
AI, however, has developed into a much narrower di-
rection, focussing more and more on special-purpose
and single-method driven solutions for problems which
were once (or still are) considered to be challenging, like
game playing, speech recognition, natural language un-
derstanding, computer vision, cognitive robotics, and
many others. 20th century AI can, in our opinion, be
perceived as expert system AI, producing and pursuing
solutions for specific tasks. We don’t say that this is
a bad development – quite in contrast, we think that
this was (and still is) a very worthwhile adventure with
ample (and in some cases well-proven) scope for consid-
erable impact on our society.
The pursuit of Artificial General Intelligence (AGI),
however, has been declining in the 20th century, pre-
sumably because the original vision of establishing sys-
tems with the envisioned capabilities turned out to be
much harder to realise than it had seemed in the begin-
ning. But in recent years a rejuvenation of the original
ideas has become apparent, driven on the one hand by
the insight that certain complex tasks are outside the
scope of specialised systems, and on the other hand
by rapid developments in the neurosciences based on
the invention of substantially refined means of record-
ing and analysing neural activation patterns in the
brain. These are accompanied by interdisciplinary ef-
forts within the cognitive science community, including
psychologists and linguists with similar visions.
It is apparent that the realisation of AGI requires
the cross-disciplinary integration of ideas, methods, and
theories. Indeed we believe that disciplines such as
(narrow) artificial intelligence, neuroscience, psychol-
ogy, and computational linguistics will have to converge
substantially before we can hope to realise human-like
artificially intelligent systems. One of the central ques-
tions in this pursuit is thus a meta-question: What are
concrete lines of research which can be pursued in the
immediate future in order to advance in the right direc-
tion? The general vision does not give any answers to
this, and while it is obvious that we require some grand
all-encompassing interdisciplinary theories for AGI, we
cannot hope to achieve this in one giant leap. For prac-
tical purposes – out of pure necessity since we cannot
shred our scientific inheritance – we require the iden-
tification of next steps, of particular topics which are
narrow enough so that they can be pursued, but gen-
eral enough so that they can advance us into the right
direction.
What We Propose
Our proposal for such a research direction starts from
two obvious observations.
• The physical implementation of our mind is based on
the neural system, i.e. on a network of neurons as
identified and investigated in the neurosciences. If
we hope to achieve Artificial General Intelligence, we
cannot expect to ignore this neural or subsymbolic
aspect of biological intelligent systems.
• Formal modelling of complex tasks and human think-
ing is based on symbol manipulation, complex sym-
bolic structures (like graphs, trees, shapes, and gram-
mars) and mathematical logic. At present, there ex-
ists no viable alternative to symbolic modelling in
order to encode complex tasks.
These two perspectives however – the neural and the
symbolic – are substantially orthogonal to each other in
terms of the state of the art in the corresponding dis-
ciplines. Neural systems are hard if not impossible to
understand symbolically. It is quite unclear at present
how symbolic processing at large emerges from neural
systems. Symbolic knowledge representation and ma-
nipulation at the level required for AGI is way outside
the scope of current artificial neural approaches.
At the same time humans – using their neural-based
brains – are able to deal successfully with symbolic
tasks, to manipulate symbolic formalisms, to represent
knowledge using them, and to solve complex problems
based on them. So apparently there is a considerable
mismatch between human neurophysiology and cogni-
tive capabilities as role models for AGI on the one hand,
and theories and computational models for neural sys-
tems and symbolic processing on the other hand.
It is our believe that significant progress in AGI re-
quires the unification of neural and symbolic approaches
in terms of theories and computational models. We be-
lieve that this unification is central for the advancement
of AGI. We also believe that the pursuit of this unifi-
cation is timely and feasible based on the current state
of the art, which is what we discuss next.
Where We Are
We briefly mention some recent developments in neural-
symbolic integration which we consider to be of particu-
lar importance. For further information on related top-
ics and the state of the art, we recommend to consult
(Bader and Hitzler, 2005; Hammer and Hitzler, 2007).
The line of investigation we want to mention takes
its starting point from computational models in (nar-
row) AI and machine learning. It sets out to realise
systems based on artificial neural networks which are
capable of learning and dealing with symbolic logic.
While this can be traced back to the landmark pa-
per (McCulloch and Pitts, 1943) on the relation be-
tween propositional logic and binary threshold neural
networks, it has been largely dormant until the 1990s,
where first neural-symbolic learning systems based on
these ideas were realised – see e.g. (Towell and Shav-
lik, 1994; d’Avila Garcez and Zaverucha, 1999; d’Avila
Garcez et al., 2002). While these initial systems were
still confined to propositional logics, in recent years
systems with similar capabilities based on first-order
logic have been realised – see e.g. (Gust et al., 2007;
Bader et al., 2008). It is to be noted, however, that
these systems – despite the fact that they provide a
conceptual breakthrough in symbol processing by arti-
ficial neural networks – are still severely limited in their
scope and applicability, and improvements in these di-
rections do not appear to be straightforward at all.
Our selection is obviously purely subjective, and
there are plenty of other related efforts which could
be mentioned. The line of investigation which we pre-
sented, however, appears to be typical and representa-
tive in that it is driven by computer science, machine
learning, or AI perspectives. We know of no work in
the area which is mainly driven by the AGI perspective,
and this includes or own achievements on the topic.1
1There are some investigations which are driven from a
neuroscience perspective, see e.g. (Yang and Shadlen, 2007),
but they do not yet cover higher-level cognitive modelling
in any reasonable sense.
Where To Go
We need to advance the state of the art in neural-
symbolic integration in order to get closer to the AGI
vision. For this, we need to improve on the established
approaches in order to find out to what limits they can
be pushed. In particular, this requires us to adapt and
improve them in order to become functional in cognitive
systems application scenarios.
At the same time, however, we also require new ideas
borrowed from other disciplines, in order to establish
neural-symbolic systems which are driven by the AGI
vision. Results from cognitive psychology on particular-
ities of human thinking which are not usually covered by
standard logical methods need to be included. Recent
paradigms for artificial neural networks which are more
strongly inspired from neuroscience – see e.g. (Maass,
2002) – need to be investigated for neural-symbolic in-
tegration. On top of this, we require creative new ideas
borrowed e.g. from dynamical systems theory or organic
computing to further the topic.
The challenges are ahead, and we hope to have con-
veyed the vital Importance of Being Neural-Symbolic.
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